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This article develops and tests theory on when and where
a new organizational form will emerge. Recent theory
holds that as the number of organizations using a particu-
lar external identity code first increases beyond a critical
minimal level, the code becomes an organizational form.
Going beyond this formulation, we theorize about how an
external identity code is established. We argue that when
the identities of individual organizations are perceptually
focused, they will more readily cohere into a distinct col-
lective identity. We develop ideas about how two observ-
able aspects of organizations might generate perceptually
focused identities in a common market: (1) de novo entry
and (2) agglomeration in a geographic place with a relat-
ed identity. Using comprehensive data from the market
for disk drive arrays, we test these ideas and an alterna-
tive by estimating effects of different specifications of
organizational and product densities on rates of entry and
exit for array producers. Overall, the analysis supports
the notion that firms with perceptually focused identities
aid in establishing an organizational form.•
In 1986, a little-known Dutch company named Twincom intro-
duced a software product designed to manage “disk drive
arrays,” which are data storage subsystems linking several
(or many) hard disk drives. In the following year, disk array
products were introduced by an additional seven companies:
1776, Atlantic Microsystems, Core International, Ford/Hig-
gins, Maximum Strategy, Thinking Machines, and Micropolis,
a disk drive manufacturer. Little over a decade later, disk
arrays had a well-established world market and were widely
used: over $12.6 billion in disk array products were sold in
1998 by 130 different producers. In a very different domain,
namely beer, another new market was developing around the
same time. In 1977, the New Albion Brewing Company
opened in Sonoma, California. It joined the existing (but
recently transformed) Anchor Brewing Company of San Fran-
cisco in offering heavier, full-flavored malt beverages (e.g.,
ales, porters, stouts) not found in the American market for
beer. In subsequent years, others followed; by 2000, the eco-
nomic contribution of mainly small “craft” breweries was
estimated at $11 billion. The market includes scores of pro-
ducers such as Anchor, commonly known as “microbrew-
eries,” as well as hundreds of other producers known as
“brewpubs.” The brewpub also makes full-flavored malt bev-
erages using craft techniques but serves them at the site of
production, usually in conjunction with food. Founded in 1987
in Hopland, California, the Hopland Brewery is widely recog-
nized as the first brewpub in the U.S. since Prohibition.
Chances are that the microbrewery and brewpub terms will
be familiar, while the disk array producer term (or anything
similar that would describe specifically the firms in this mar-
ket) will not be. Chances are also that it would not take much
thought to name a microbrewery or brewpub, but it would
take some research to name a disk array producer other than
one of those listed above. The comparison thus raises two
questions. First, does it matter that in the one market we
have readily accessible descriptive labels to classify and dis-
tinguish participating firms while in the other we do not? Sec-
ond, presuming it does matter, how can we account for the
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difference in public cognitive status of the various
organizations?
Our answer to the first question is that having descriptive
labels does matter. In our view, the ready accessibility of
classificatory terms for types of organization derives directly
from whether or not a particular type of organization consti-
tutes an organizational form, defined as a recognizable pat-
tern of activity that takes on rule-like standing, which Pólos,
Hannan, and Carroll (2002) called a code. The term code here
denotes and connotes both cognitive recognition and impera-
tive standing. By this definition, a form is an external identity
code, meaning that it is the perceptions and opinions of “out-
siders” that matter. The external identity code possesses
rule-like status, so that its observable violation is negatively
sanctioned—it causes outsiders to drop discontinuously their
valuation of the entity to which it is applied.
Our concept of organizational form implies legitimation or
social-taken-for-grantedness, sometimes called constitutive
legitimation. Much contemporary organizational theory treats
legitimation as both privileging and constraining. An organiza-
tion possessing a legitimated organizational form appears
unproblematic and can be interacted with and regulated
unambiguously; accordingly, it typically benefits from greater
access to resources, more protection from authorities, and
higher visibility—all provided that the organization does not
violate any of the form-specific rules constraining its appear-
ance and behavior (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zuckerman,
1999). We view establishment of legitimation as a process in
which positive returns potentially increase from the first
appearance of a potential organizational form up to a subse-
quent ceiling, signaling the organizational form’s establish-
ment. These positive returns of the form-establishment
process involve ease of organizing, resulting in higher rates
of organizational founding and enhanced life chances for the
organizations using the potential form.
Accepting our answer to the first question means that the
second question actually asks, When and where will a new
organizational form emerge? In an exploratory case study of
the disk array market, McKendrick and Carroll (2001) exam-
ined arguments drawn from organizational theory and juxta-
posed them with basic facts of the situation. They found that
the disk array organizational form had not developed, despite
the presence of formal institutions representing collective
action and ecological processes often associated with form
emergence. They speculated that the reason the form had
not crystallized lies in organizational diversity: the heteroge-
neous set of origin industries spawning and still supporting
disk array producers (i.e., continuing to provide the bulk of
many firms’ revenue) makes it difficult for the disk array pro-
ducer organizational form to gain perceptual recognition and
take hold. The difficulty arises because form establishment is
essentially about identity formation: if many firms in the mar-
ket derive their primary identities from other activities and
there are few firms deriving their primary identity from disk
arrays, then the disk array producer identity will likely not be
readily perceived by outsiders, thus impeding its coherence
into a code or form.
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McKendrick and Carroll’s (2001) case materials suggest a
reformulated specification, which we develop below, of the
density-dependent process commonly thought to generate a
legitimated organizational form. More precisely, an organiza-
tional form likely emanates from the density of producers
with perceptually focused identities in a market, rather than
the total density number typically used by ecologists, and the
perceptions of outsiders will be more focused when the iden-
tities arise from (1) de novo entrants and (2) entrants that are
concentrated in geographic locations that possess related
identities. We used firm-level event-history data collected for
every producer to enter the market for disk arrays worldwide,
from Twincom’s initial introduction to the end of 1998, to test
these arguments in analyses of organizational entry and exit.
PRIOR THEORY AND RESEARCH ON FORMS
In her review of the literature on the evolution of new organi-
zational forms, Romanelli (1991: 81) claimed that “no theoret-
ical consensus exists regarding an approach to the problem”
of how new forms emerge and become established and that
“the conceptual approaches are diverging.” More tellingly,
Romanelli also found no generally accepted common defini-
tion of the organizational form concept. She determined that
from the many theoretical arguments about form emergence
that had been proposed, “no overarching themes for integrat-
ing these perspectives” could be identified (Romanelli, 1991:
100). Romanelli concluded on a positive note: she advised
organizational theorists to embrace the conceptual diversity
about forms, to emphasize differences among various con-
ceptualizations, and to illustrate the quality of various defini-
tions through theoretically directed empirical research.
In the period since Romanelli’s (1991) review, usage of the
organizational form concept has probably become even more
elastic. As Romanelli (1991: 81–82) noted, at the broadest
level, “the concept of organizational form refers to those
characteristics of an organization that identify it as a distinct
entity and, at the same time, classify it as a member of a
group of similar organizations,” yet many proposed defini-
tions are so highly abstract they lack empirical bite. For
example, in his pioneering book on organizational classifica-
tion, McKelvey (1982: 107) first defined form as “a concept
to broadly capture the character of an organization’s struc-
ture, function and process.” He then later redefined it as
“that which is measured by taxonomic characters” and sug-
gested that “the best strategy for selecting taxonomic char-
acters is to measure everything possible” with an emphasis
on “characters associated with dominant competence and
evolutionary/ecological importance” (McKelvey, 1982: 214).
The most common type of definition uses specific features
of organizations to identify and define organizational forms
(Carroll and Hannan, 2000; Pólos, Hannan, and Carroll, 2002).
This approach emanates from Weber’s (1968) analysis of the
rational-legal bureaucracy, which he defined in terms of fea-
tures such as authority, procedures, and the employment
relation of the official. The feature-based conception of form
has developed to recognize that some features—so-called
“core” features—are more important than others in distin-
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guishing forms (Scott, 1998). Organizations with the same
core features belong to the same form, by this view.
A second popular definition of organizational form is based on
the presumption that distinctions among forms reflect social
processes and boundary creation (DiMaggio, 1986; Hannan
and Freeman, 1989). In this view, the clarity and strength of
social boundaries define forms—sharper boundaries generate
clearer forms. The key to understanding forms, then, involves
looking at the processes that create and maintain boundaries,
including social networks, technological change, closed flows
of personnel among a set of organizations, changes in pat-
terns of resource flows, and the like.
In the view of Pólos and colleagues (Pólos et al., 1998; Pólos,
Hannan, and Carroll, 2002), both types of definitions of form
suffer from limitations, the most serious of which is the lack
of connection between forms and identities (see also Ruef,
1999; Zuckerman and Kim, 2003). In their view, the form
classification rules of organizations should not be divorced
from the social world, because classifying forms involves
social and cultural typifications—widely agreed-upon classifi-
cations of entities into types (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott,
1995). Empirical research on such processes suggests that
they build on organizational identities (Zuckerman, 1999,
2000; Ruef, 2000).
Form as Identity
The research reported here followed Romanelli’s (1991) sug-
gestion to demonstrate the value of specific definitions of
form through empirical research rather than try to incorporate
many meanings into a single analysis. Accordingly, in asking
how and when organizational forms emerge, we followed
Pólos, Hannan, and Carroll (2002) in defining an organizational
form as a recognizable social code that possesses rule-like
standing and therefore denotes and connotes both cognitive
recognition and imperative standing. So, a code can be
understood as (1) a set of interpretative signals, as in the
“genetic code,” and (2) as a set of rules of conduct, as in the
“penal code.” In Pólos, Hannan, and Carroll’s (2002) formula-
tion, the key identity code for an organizational form is exter-
nal. There are potentially an infinite number of forms, but
only activities that acquire external recognition and are con-
strained by the sanctions of outsiders gain form status; forms
do not exist independent of external agents. Identity codes
for organizational forms typically consist of abstract features
as well as composition rules about appropriate combinations
of particular features.
A form identity applies to multiple organizations and persists
over time. This is because once established, a form identity
gets embedded in other societal institutions, such as lan-
guages, directories, and public labels. For example, the yel-
low pages of the phone book give a very basic set of organi-
zational forms for many, but not all, of the entries. For form
identities in more technical markets, such as that for disk
arrays, one might look at how technical and buyer-oriented
publications place firms into groupings, how companies refer
to themselves and their products in advertisements and
other public announcements, and how gatekeepers to critical
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resources such as capital and labor categorize firms. Many of
the classifications built into these sources reflect the implicit
rules about forms used by external gatekeepers to organize,
evaluate, and sanction individual organizations.
Form Emergence
Although a particular set of organizational features might
develop an external identity, this does not mean that the
identity has become an organizational form, unless it has also
been enforced and taken for granted by outsiders, i.e., the
identity must be codified, socially embedded, and sanctioned.
An implication of this construction is that it “allows us to
define populations that never achieve form status and to
extend meaningfully the definitions of populations back to
the period of early legitimation” (Pólos, Hannan, and Carroll,
2002: 107). Thus, populations can be defined not by forms,
as received ecological theory does, but instead by identities,
the most specific and minimal external identities applicable.
Pólos, Hannan, and Carroll (2002) have theorized about when
a specific nascent external identity will become an organiza-
tional form. They linked the form-generation process to
prevalence, or organizational density, and specified a form-
specific application number, ν(φ), that marks the number of
organizations to which a social identity must apply for the
identity to gain organizational form status. That is, identities
become forms at varying points in populations’ histories,
depending on ν(φ) and their density levels. Moreover, the
form-specific number ν(φ) represents the density Nφat which
the legitimation-enhancing returns of new organizatıons join-
ing the population reach a ceiling. This means that “the peri-
od in a population’s history between its inception and the
time at which density surpasses ν(φ) is the crucial period of
legitimation in the sense of taken-for-grantedness” (Pólos,
Hannan, and Carroll, 2002: 107).
Applying this idea to a potential new form identity might be
straightforward: from inception, one can count the number of
organizations N holding the minimal identity at various peri-
ods t and then look during each period for other phenomena
typically associated with a legitimated organizational form.
The point at which these phenomena are first seen should
coincide roughly with N(t) = Nφ = ν(φ). Following this strategy,
McKendrick and Carroll (2001) found that the number of disk
array producers entering the market rose steadily over the
early years, eventually slowing down and stabilizing and,
finally, declining slightly. From received ecological theory,
which holds that legitimation of a population increases with
density at a decreasing rate and approaches a ceiling at high
levels of density (Carroll and Hannan, 2000: 222–228), it
would thus be plausible to reason that the disk array identity
became a form at least before the time and the density level
of the population stabilized. Other compelling information
made it clear, however, that the identity had yet to develop
into a form, thus leading McKendrick and Carroll (2001) to
conclude that the theory was deficient. For example,
although the industry information service provider Disk/Trend
classified disk arrays as a single industry, we know from
extensive interviews with executives and others that this
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#9917—ASQ V48 N1—March 2003—file: 03-mckendrick
classification category was only one of several ways partici-
pants and outsiders perceived the market, even in the period
after organizational density had stabilized. Other relevant out-
siders, such as security firms’ market analysts, seldom
focused on a disk array (or similarly termed) industry, prefer-
ring instead to stay at the more encompassing level of “data
storage” (see Hambrecht and Quist, 1998; Tucker Anthony,
1998). Moreover, these analysts’ reports usually did not con-
tain subgroupings based on the disk array form or organiza-
tional type; instead, they described individual companies and
their particular technologies or product lines (e.g., video or
audio streaming, transaction processing, web caching). A
similar lack of consensus about appropriate form was evident
among market insiders. So, for instance, companies referred
to themselves variously as involved in “storage,” “storage
subsystems,” “RAID (Redundant Array of Independent
Disks),” “disk arrays,” “network attached storage,” and
other categories. As the director of product marketing at
Maximum Strategy said, “Companies are starting to go away
from saying [disk arrays], and are instead talking about what
they offer. We provide high bandwidth” (Electronic Engineer-
ing Times, 1996: 47). One prominent company even went so
far as to publish a book attempting to clarify the many con-
fusing terms in the industry (Network Appliance, 2002).
Figure 1 provides some data about this identity ambiguity
from searches we conducted in LexisNexis on the various
identity labels. For each year from 1985 to 2000, we
searched the full texts of all business and finance articles in
the business category of LexisNexis to count the number of
times a particular identity label was used. Figure 1 shows
two plots: one gives the count for articles that used the word
strings “disk array” and “company” at the same time, while
the other gives the counts for uses of the exact word string
“data storage company.” Usages of both terms rose in the
period, suggesting possible identity formation, but while the
disk array usage was more common in the early years, it was
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Figure 1. Counts of business press usage of two possible identity form labels.
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overtaken by the more restrictive use of “data storage com-
pany” later. This suggested to us that the disk array form
was likely not yet fully established and that the identities
remained in flux.
Perceptually Focused Identities
McKendrick and Carroll’s (2001) case study led us to pursue a
different argument and specification of the form-emergence
process, taking into account the perceptions of external agents
(such as financial analysts, bankers, suppliers, distributors,
potential employees, and customers), because it is through
these agents’ perceptions and sanctions that form identities
emerge and persist. It is not clear, however, when and how
these external actors perceive that a set of organizations with
which they potentially interact possesses a new identity that
should be subject to some sanctioning. We propose that such
a perception occurs when the identities of the individual orga-
nizations in a population somehow become focused on at least
some of their common components. This means that the per-
ceptions of external actors are directed to some salient com-
mon features of a set of organizations and that there is some,
perhaps implicit, recognition of this commonality as a distinc-
tive social entity (the identity or nascent form). Perceptually
focused identities are important for a variety of mutually rein-
forcing reasons. First, focused identities mean that both insid-
ers and outsiders will be more likely to recognize and identify
something distinctive. So, focus increases salience. Second,
the greater homogeneity of organizations with focused identi-
ties implies that form boundaries and exclusion rules are sim-
pler. Simpler boundary rules make policing or sanctioning pos-
sible (Zuckerman, 1999). Third, salience and homogeneity
provide the seedbed for generating solidarity and organizing for
self-promotion and defense (Buechler, 2000).
If these speculations are valid, then they lead to a reformulat-
ed specification of the density-dependent form-generation
process advanced by Pólos, Hannan, and Carroll (2002). We
retain the core idea that identity of a form derives from the
aggregated identities of individual organizations; we also
retain the form-specific application number ν(φ) for achieving
form status. But rather than base this number on density per
se, we base it on the number of organizations with perceptu-
ally focused identities, NPφ. Now an organizational form
emanates from initial rises (when density is low) in the densi-
ty of producers with perceptually focused identities in a par-
ticular market rather than from initial rises in total density. In
other words, form φ emerges at time t when 
NP(t) = NPφ = ν(φ), 
which can be stated as a proposition:
Theoretical proposition: Establishment of an organizational form is
positively related to initial rises (when density is low) in the density
of organizations with perceptually focused identities.
Of course, in a newly developing market, the products of par-
ticipating organizations may also be highly visible. When
some organizations produce multiple products, this possibility
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raises the question of whether collective identities are built
around products or organizations. The case for organizations
comes from their multidimensional nature: identity springs
from their joint presence in labor, product, and financial mar-
kets, among others (Baron, 2002). Products develop identities
in more restricted arenas, but these may be very large from
the perspective of individuals and reflect heavily on the under-
lying producer organization. Indeed, individuals’ perceptions of
particular organizations likely spring from experiences with
products, not only in use but through advertisements, demon-
strations at trade shows, press releases, and the like. If so,
then organizational form identities might emerge from the
number (density) of products promulgated by producer organi-
zations. This possibility suggests an alternative proposition:
Alternative theoretical proposition: Establishment of an organiza-
tional form is positively related to initial rises (when density is low)
in the density of products associated with a particular activity.
Empirical Hypotheses
For empirical research, an advantage of the theoretical propo-
sition is that it can be readily incorporated into extant models
of density-dependent legitimation. As explained above, NPφ
represents the density level at which an identity acquires the
character of a form, meaning that it is fully legitimated or
taken for granted. Before this point, as NP(t) grows from 0 to
NPφ, the taken-for-grantedness of the identity increases by at
least two mechanisms (Hannan and Carroll, 1992: 41): (1)
“collective action by members of the population to define,
explain and codify its [potential] organizational form and to
defend itself from claims and attacks of rival populations”
and (2) “collective learning by which effective routines and
social structures become collectively fine-tuned, codified and
promulgated.” Ecologists claim that the strength of both
mechanisms tracks organizational density; and substantial
empirical research on a variety of populations shows that as
density rises from early low levels, organizational founding
rates increase and mortality rates fall, exactly as increasing
legitimation would lead one to expect (Carroll and Hannan,
2000). Accordingly, a similar empirical test of the theoretical
proposition would consist of relating NP(t) to the vital rates of
an emergent organizational population.
Fully specifying a model for empirical testing requires further
conceptual elaboration, namely, linking the perceptually
focused identity concept with measurable characteristics of
organizations to calculate NP(t). Many sophisticated instru-
ments or methods can be designed to measure focus in
organizational identity, but a number of these would be
impossible to apply to nonexisting, previously failed organiza-
tions. To overcome this obstacle, we prefer in this initial
exploration to use readily identifiable, observable organiza-
tional characteristics that can be ascertained systematically
from the historical record, which also facilitates comparative
analysis (Carroll and Hannan, 2000). One observable charac-
teristic is an organization’s status upon entry into a market.
McKendrick and Carroll (2001) conjectured that the disk array
producer organizational form did not fully take hold in the
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observed early phase of the market because disk array pro-
ducers came from a heterogeneous set of origin industries
and often retained operations in those industries, perhaps
still deriving the bulk of their revenue therein. In their view,
the problem resided in the externally perceived basis of
firms’ identities: so long as firms in the disk array market
derived their primary identities from other activities and few
firms derived their primary identity from disk arrays, then the
disk array producer identity seemed unlikely to be perceived
by outsiders. That is, the high levels of organizational diversi-
ty and diversification made it unlikely that the common disk
array features would cohere into a code or form of its own;
the external perceptions of identities were not focused in this
context.
De novo entry. McKendrick and Carroll (2001) used these
general arguments to claim that in the disk array market, de
novo firms possessed greater focus than de alio firms that
came into the market from a wide variety of other activities in
which they often remained active. This means that initially—
when density is low—a density count of de novo firms
should show legitimation-enhancing effects on the whole set
of producers. In this sense, focus is about perception: focus
helps outsiders see and legitimate the activity, not improve
the life chances of de novo firms themselves. That is, we set
NP(t) to record de novo producers and hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Organizational founding rates of all organiza-
tions engaged in a particular production activity will rise with initial
increases (when density is low) in the density of de novo producers
engaged in the same activity.
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Organizational mortality rates of all organiza-
tions engaged in a particular production activity will decline with ini-
tial increases (when density is low) in the density of de novo pro-
ducers engaged in the same activity.
This formulation is also more consistent with the market’s
overall empirical trends. Specifically, McKendrick and Carroll
(2001) showed that, unlike total density, the annual density of
de novo disk array producers did not rise to a stable point
and then subside. Rather, de novo density appeared to be
still in a growth phase. More importantly, because it did not
level off and was still rising upward, the trajectory of de novo
density did not give the general impression that the identity
had been legitimated. It suggested, instead, that the identity
was undergoing institutionalization and may not yet have
been fully legitimated.
Although this formulation appears theoretically sound and
empirically consistent with the facts of the disk array case, it
contradicts one drawn from another popular perspective on
legitimation. The so-called sociopolitical view of legitimation
holds that endorsement by powerful actors yields advantages
to organizational forms and aids in the process of legitimation
(Scott, 1995). It follows logically then that if and when larger
established (powerful) organizations enter a market, then
legitimation should be enhanced. IBM’s entry into the person-
al computer market is a well-known case that seems consis-
tent with this argument. In terms of organizational density by
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entry mode, the prediction most consistent with this view
would be that de alio density contributes the greatest to
legitimation because de alio entrants are usually larger and
more powerful than de novo entrants. There is an extensive
prior literature about the effects of de novo/de alio status on
firm mortality and failure rates (see Carroll et al., 1996, for a
partial review), and a general finding is that de alio firms
experience lower mortality rates, especially in their early
years. This suggests, too, that de alio firms are stronger com-
petitors. The theory developed here, however, concerns the
effects of densities of de novo and de alio organizations on a
focal organization, not the de novo or de alio status of the
focal firm, which is the subject of almost all prior research.
So, the prior literature on de novo and de alio entry is only
suggestive at best in terms of the legitimation of identities.
The intuition behind hypotheses 1a and 1b comes from per-
ceptual considerations based on viewing organizations in a
focal market as whole social entities. The assumption is that
external actors see or know about aspects of the participat-
ing organizations that transcend the focal market. From this
perception, the common component of focal market partici-
pation (i.e., the potential new form) is more likely to domi-
nate when more organizations operate mainly in the focal
market, as de novo entrants do. By contrast, diversified firms
may interact with external agents in ways that do not height-
en perceptions of the focal market. For example, the financial
reports of publicly traded firms may not highlight some of the
smaller new markets in which the firms are engaged.
Agglomeration in a geographical place with a related
identity. Another potential contributor to perceptually
focused identities arises from considerations based on out-
siders’ views of those organizations most frequently encoun-
tered socially. If one’s high-frequency interaction partners
include many organizations with the potential new organiza-
tional form, then one is more likely to recognize (at least
implicitly) and sanction the form. A second-order network
effect may also occur: one’s perception of a possible form is
heightened when many of one’s interaction partners interact
with organizations possessing the common properties. Dis-
cerning the interaction patterns of external agents with
respect to organizations and each other is extremely difficult,
though, especially those occurring in the distant past. A plau-
sible alternative is to compare the effects of organizations
grouped by various geographic locations, in particular, those
locations with high numbers of firms in the focal market and
with place identities recognized by the market’s participants
and external agents. Compared with other locations, these
places are likely to have identities related to the new activity,
thereby providing more focus to outsiders’ perceptions.
Geographers and other scholars of regions and regionalism
commonly view localities as socially defined perceptual units
that only exist in relation to particular criteria (Allen, Massey,
and Cochrane, 1998; MacLeod, 2001). Although places have
a real physical environment and a spatial dimension, they are
not defined by a precise geographic boundary. Rather, they
become known with regard to different spheres of social
action and so may have multiple identities: political, cultural,
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social, and economic. In this regard, they are a medium for
social interaction, and their identities are socially constructed.
As Paasi (1996: 8) put it, “individual actors and collectivities
are socialized as members of specific territorially bounded
spatial entities and .|.|. more or less actively internalize territo-
rial identities and shared traditions.” The very naming of
places helps to construct their identities, connecting their
images with the perceptions of insiders and outsiders. Acad-
emics, journalists, regional protagonists, business executives,
and politicians use language to popularize, establish, and sus-
tain places in the consciousness of society (Carr, 1986; Paasi,
1996; MacLeod, 2001). A place explicitly comes into being
and acquires an identity through these discourses (Pred,
1989).
The place identities of interest here relate to the industrial
world. Social scientists have long noted that firms in the
same market often agglomerate (Marshall, 1920; Weber,
1929; Hoover, 1948). By agglomerating, firms increase their
interactions with each other and make collective action more
likely. Agglomeration also often produces a common percep-
tion among participants and outsiders that something with an
identity resides therein. A local culture emerges that defines
or unifies organizational actors through a mutual awareness
of their common industrial purpose (Storper, 1995). This
coherence consists of a similar spirit of enterprise, organiza-
tional practices, action rules, customs, understandings, and
values (Saxenian, 1994). Indeed, in describing particular
agglomerations, analysts typically use language strongly sug-
gesting that organizations derive public cognitive recognition
from clustering with similar others; this is especially true for
those who have written about Italian “industrial districts”
(Brusco, 1982; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Becattini, 1990). Of
course, many geographical places possess socio-economic
identities. The sheer number of organizations and employees
in a related activity can make them a coherent identifiable
organizational community. But our sense is that prevalence in
itself does not contribute to the emergence of an organiza-
tional form. Rather, a form often exists before a place
becomes identified with it. For example, although Dalton,
Georgia, is typically seen as the world’s carpet manufacturing
center, carpet making already existed as a form before Dalton
acquired that identity.
A strong place identity can override firm differences to con-
tribute to form emergence in two general ways. One is if the
geographic area is a known place with a preexisting social
identity of its own. For instance, Silicon Valley and Route 128,
which feature prominently in the market for disk arrays, are
known for their excellence across several technological mar-
kets. Organizations in these milieux have a collective identity
as “technology firms,” thereby signaling to external actors
that they are members of a community known for the cre-
ation of new firms, technologies, and markets. The second
way, related to the first, is if the place has a preexisting iden-
tity related to or closely associated with activities in the new
market. For instance, such a place may have had a reputation
as a center of data storage, and so this identity would confer
greater visibility on the disk array firms located there. Forms
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seem more likely to emerge out of locales with preexisting
related place identities because external agents already asso-
ciate these places with similar kinds of activities, thereby giv-
ing the new activity greater perceptual focus. So, when firms
in a particular new market agglomerate in places with related
social identities, they should be more likely to generate a
coherent identity of their own and thus an organizational
form. This argument sets NP(t) to track the density of geo-
graphically agglomerated producers in a place with a related
identity, which leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Organizational founding rates of all organiza-
tions engaged in a particular production activity will rise with initial
increases (when density is low) in the density of geographically
agglomerated producers in a place with an identity related to the
same activity.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Organizational mortality rates of all organiza-
tions engaged in a particular production activity will decline with ini-
tial increases (when density is low) in the density of geographically
agglomerated producers in a place with an identity related to the
same activity.
Our formulation relates to other recent work in organizational
ecology that has also advanced theoretical ideas about geo-
graphic boundaries and legitimation. Both Hannan et al.
(1995) and Bigelow et al. (1997) argued that social legitima-
tion of a form operates on a broader geographic scale than
competition because political and physical barriers are more
likely to interrupt the exchange of goods and people than
they are ideas or cultural images. This argument led to a mul-
tilevel specification of density dependence, with density for
legitimation counted across geographic boundaries and for
competition counted only within boundaries (Bigelow et al.,
1997; Hannan, 1997). Although hypotheses 2a and 2b may at
first blush appear at odds with these claims, there are at
least two reasons why they need not be. First, Hannan et
al.’s (1995) theory can be seen as concerning the legitimation
within a newly emergent population of a form previously
established in another context (a type of diffusion), while the
current hypotheses address the initial emergence of an orga-
nizational form in any population. Second, Hannan et al.’s
(1995) argument involved claims about the exchange of infor-
mation across (and thus the interdependence of) various geo-
graphic units, which are essentially about where to draw the
population boundaries rather than how to count density once
the boundaries are determined. In any event, neither poten-
tial complication pertains to this study, given that it is about a
potentially new form in a single worldwide population.
Combined effects. The two perceptually driven processes
hypothesized above may operate jointly. When de novo pro-
ducers possess focused identities and congregate in a partic-
ular geographic area with a related place identity, the two
processes should combine to speed up legitimation (an inter-
action effect) even faster than their individual effects,
because the two processes operate in different ways. De
novo density represents a process of simple accretion in col-
lective identity: each member possesses (virtually) the same
identity, and as more members enter the market, the identity
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gains force by sheer numbers. By contrast, the agglomera-
tion process involves muting many other aspects of firm
identity and causes attention to cohere around the common
dimension. Although different, the two processes do not
work in opposition. So, interacting regularly with many orga-
nizations possessing the same apparent features should
accelerate identity formation and legitimation of a potential
organizational form initially when density is low. These argu-
ments lead to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Organizational founding rates of all organiza-
tions engaged in a particular production activity will rise with initial
increases (when density is low) in the density of geographically
agglomerated de novo producers in a place with an identity related
to the same activity.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): Organizational mortality rates of all organiza-
tions engaged in a particular production activity will decline with ini-
tial increases (when density is low) in the density of geographically
agglomerated de novo producers in a place with an identity related
to the same activity.
Product densities. Finally, we need to consider the alterna-
tive theoretical proposition based on product density rather
than organizational density. It is rather straightforward to
develop a basic pair of hypotheses linking product density to
form establishment:
Alternative hypothesis 1a (Alt. H1a): Organizational founding rates
of all organizations engaged in a particular production activity will
rise with initial increases (when density is low) in the density of
products associated with the same activity.
Alternative hypothesis 1b (Alt. H1b): Organizational mortality rates
of all organizations engaged in a particular production activity will
decline with initial increases (when density is low) in the density of
products associated with the same activity.
Brief Background on Disk Arrays
The main technical components of a disk array are (1) a set
of disk drives; (2) configuration of the drives into some kind
of interdependent system; (3) the interconnect protocols in
the system; (4) the storage controller; and (5) the system
cache architecture. The business of disk arrays appears even
more complicated because arrays are sold with varying
degrees of completeness (Disk/Trend, 1999). A number of
companies sell subsystems (complete arrays ready to use),
but product groups also include boards (array controllers,
power supplies, and other components without disk drives)
and software (an individual software product providing array
functionality). Thus, companies may specialize in boards or
software, or they may provide complete systems. Companies
may also be independent providers or captive producers mak-
ing arrays for their own computer systems. Pinning down the
exact first appearance of disk array technology is difficult.
The technology originates in the idea of redundant, or fail-
safe, computing when on-line transaction processing began
to emerge in the 1960s, and multiple disk drives were bun-
dled with computer systems for which they were specifically
designed. Yet companies were slow to offer fail-safe disk
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storage products that worked with a variety of computers,
making a market for disk drive arrays slow to develop (see
McKendrick and Carroll, 2001, for a fuller account of the
history).
The market for disk arrays is segmented in a number of
ways, and firms differ in the scope of their offerings. Arrays
are sold in four identifiable primary markets: the computer
mainframe array market (e.g., computer reservation sys-
tems), the network/midrange multiuser market (the bulk of
the disk array market), the single-user market, and the spe-
cialized high performance market (e.g., video servers, geo-
physical exploration data analysis). A disk array can have as
few as two disk drives or as many as 200, though most
arrays contain fewer than 100 drives.
During 1998, 134 companies offered array subsystems,
boards, or software at one time or another, but three firms—
IBM, EMC, and Compaq Computer—held almost three-quar-
ters of the total market (Disk/Trend, 1999). Led by IBM and
Compaq, captive sales accounted for almost two-thirds of
industry revenue. EMC was the largest independent supplier,
accounting for more than half of non-captive sales, followed
by Data General and Hitachi Data Systems. U.S. firms held
90 percent of the market.
METHODS
We used archival data on the disk array market to identify the
complete set of firms that has ever offered a product on this
market at any time. In testing the hypotheses, we used infor-
mation on the times of market participation to estimate rate
models of organizational founding and mortality. The indepen-
dent variables consisted of time-varying measures of the
number of organizations in the market (density) by entry
mode (de novo/de alio), the number of products on the mar-
ket (product density), and several important geographically
based density counts from places with a related identity (the
Boston Area, the San Francisco Bay Area, and California). We
also included a number of time-varying control variables in
the models to help rule out alternative interpretations. These
included firm tenure in the market, public/private company
status, number of products, product submarkets, product dis-
tribution channels, firm size, membership in an industry asso-
ciation, venture capital recipient, population age at entry, den-
sity, density at founding, venture capital funding of industry,
density of industry association, and industry revenue. We
describe below sources and metrics of the variables.
Data Sources on Disk Array Producers
The data analyzed here covered the complete set of disk
array producers serving the market worldwide, dating from
the Twincom product in 1986 through the end of 1998, the
last year of full coverage from the most comprehensive
source of data available. The data came primarily from
Disk/Trend, Inc. Disk/Trend published annual reports on disk
drive arrays, as well as other kinds of storage. The first
Disk/Trend report on arrays was published in 1993. The
reports covered every company that made complete subsys-
tems, boards, or software specifically intended to permit disk
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drives to operate as an array. The reports also listed specifi-
cations for each product a company shipped and the date of
its first shipment.
In addition, we compiled event histories through extensive
library and online searches for each company identified by
Disk/Trend as an array manufacturer, which also turned up a
few companies that made disk drive arrays prior to the publi-
cation of Disk/Trend. In some cases, the event histories
revealed shipment dates that preceded those listed in
Disk/Trend and provided more accurate dates for entry into
and exit from the array market.
Entry and exit of array producers. A firm’s first date of
product shipment signified its entry into the array market. It
was more difficult to determine organizational mortality or
ending events, however, than entry. For organizational mortal-
ity or ending events, the most important distinctions concern
(1) disbanding of the firm, (2) exit to another industry, and (3)
merger or acquisition by another firm. The meaning of dis-
banding is unambiguous: the firm failed as a collective actor.
Exit to another industry also suggests a lack of success in
array manufacturing. The merger and acquisition ending
events are harder to interpret. Although merger and acquisi-
tion both result in the loss of one or more organizations,
firms merge and are acquired for diverse reasons. Some-
times a firm flounders, and its owners seek to recover some
fraction of their investment by selling the firm. In other
cases, a thriving firm’s competencies command great value
from potential acquirers or merger partners (Carroll and Han-
nan, 2000). Because of the ambiguous meaning of mergers
and acquisitions, we based our analysis on the disbanding
and exit to another industry and, consistent with standard
practice, treated mergers and acquisitions as censored
observations.
We sometimes did not know exactly what happened to firms
when they dropped from the set of producers; this was often
the case when spells of array production were short and
when the scale of production was tiny. Our reading of the
source materials and our knowledge of the market suggested
that most exits of unknown type were disbandings or exits to
other industries. So, we treated these two events alike: the
dependent variable in this analysis was disbanding/exit to
another industry, defined to include events of unknown type.
Firms known to have ended by other events (merger, acquisi-
tion) were treated as (non-informatively) censored on the
right at the times of these events. We identified 258 firms
that entered the market. The count began in 1986 and cov-
ered all firms known to offer disk arrays up to and including
eleven new entrants in 1998. Over the short history of the
array market, there were 114 disbanding/industry exits and
14 mergers/acquisitions.
Firm-Level Variables
We measured a number of firm-level variables. The variable
the organizations research literature labels organizational age
is usually a measure of tenure in a particular organizational
population. For the majority of array producers (212 of the
258 firms, or 83 percent), we knew the exact annual quarter-
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ly date of entry and exit in the array market, based on prod-
uct shipment. For the minority of array producers without
quarterly entry and exit dates (17 percent of firms), we knew
the year of entry and exit and randomly assigned quarterly
dates within that year. Tenures in the disk array market were
then calculated based on these quarterly entry and exit data.
For de novo/de alio status, we determined from the source
materials whether a firm was a de novo or de alio producer.
We used a dummy variable to indicate de novo status. Using
a variety of sources listing public companies, we attempted
to determine public/private status by identifying every public
firm in our database by year of operation. This dummy vari-
able took a value of one in the period when a company was
listed as publicly traded and zero otherwise. We counted the
number of products for each firm as the number of distinct
products on the disk array market in a given year. We divided
the market for disk arrays into four distinct product submar-
kets and recorded whether a firm sold a product in each of
these. The submarkets were single use, mainframe comput-
er, networks, and high performance. Participation in each
submarket was measured by a dummy variable. We recorded
whether the array producer was a captive firm, OEM (original
equipment manufacturer), or PCM (a plug compatible manu-
facturer, reseller, and distributor). Preliminary analysis
showed that the effects for OEM and PCM firm-level charac-
teristics were similar and could be efficiently combined into a
single dummy variable, OEM or PCM, which we report in
estimates below; captive array producers thus represented
the omitted comparison for this dummy variable.
We measured firm size as the firm’s annual revenue from its
sale of arrays. For the major array producers in the market—
i.e., the top 15 to 25 annual array producers, such as EMC,
IBM, and DEC, which collectively represented approximately
90 percent of all annual industry revenue—we had precise
firm-specific revenue data from Disk/Trend. For the few major
producers that existed prior to Disk/Trend’s coverage in 1992,
we linearly interpolated backwards the firm-specific revenues
of their earlier annual spells, using their actual revenue trajec-
tory post-1992 as the functional form for our imputation. For
the smallest and shortest-lived array producers, Disk/Trend
did not publish firm-specific revenue figures, and we were
unable to find more precise disk array revenue figures for
them from other sources. But Disk/Trend did record the
annual aggregate revenue of these non-major, smaller array
producers based on the distribution channel they used (cap-
tive, OEM, and PCM) and geographic location (companies
based in the United States and those not in the United
States). Since we knew which of these six different cate-
gories Disk/Trend used to classify smaller array producers,
we were able to impute an annual revenue for each smaller
array producer, based on the average revenue for a firm in
that category. In exploratory models, we estimated models
using the size variable in log form and did not find any major
changes in estimation. Because the log size specification
amplifies differences among small firms and the data for
these firms were less reliable, we believed the other specifi-
cation was preferable.
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We constructed a firm-specific time-varying dummy variable
to indicate whether a firm was a member in the major indus-
try association that operated within the disk array industry
during the period under study, the RAID Advisory Board (RAB
member). To identify which firms received venture capital,
we searched the SDC Platinum database constructed by
Thomson Financial Securities Data and a variety of other
sources listing companies that received venture capital to
identify such firms in the disk array market. We used a
dummy variable to indicate firms that received venture capital
(venture capital recipient). To take into account population
age at entry, we constructed a fixed firm-level variable that
recorded the age of the organizational population at the time
of market entry that took the value of one in the first year of
the disk array market and then increased in increments annu-
ally. It was intended as a control for possible effects of popu-
lation aging, including first-mover or order-of-entry advan-
tages in the disk array market.
Population-level and Other Environmental Variables
Organizational density. We used the life-history information
on firms to construct a variety of density counts. These vari-
ables measured the total number of firms of a particular kind
operating in any given year. In most models below, we used
a time-varying count of basic density, measuring all the firms
in the market. We also used a time-invariant variable giving
the density in the year of market entry for each firm (for justi-
fication of these specifications, see Carroll and Hannan,
2000). We used a linear specification of organizational densi-
ty, since it is consistent with our theorizing, and the inclusion
of a quadratic specification did not substantively affect our
estimates.
Focused-identity densities. Tests of the theoretical proposi-
tion about perceptually focused identities were conducted
with several different kinds of NP(t) density counts. First, we
used the density of de novo firms to test H1a and H1b. We
then looked at the effects of several density variables based
on geography to test H2a and H2b. We focused on the three
locations where disk array producers agglomerated and there
was a sense of place identity operative in the market: the
Boston Area (Route 128) in Massachusetts, California, and
the Bay Area in Northern California, which included mostly
firms in “Silicon Valley” and a few firms just north of or
across the bay. Finally, we examined the effects of density
counts measuring de novo producers within specific geo-
graphical areas, e.g., California de novo producers and, finally,
most narrowly, the Bay Area de novo producers. These last
density variables were appropriate for testing H3a and H3b.1
We used the information on firms’ annual product counts to
construct product densities. These variables measured the
total number of products of a particular kind on the market in
any given year. In the models below, we used a time-varying
count of product density, measuring all the products in the
market. Tests of the alternative theoretical proposition about
products were conducted with several different kinds of
product density counts. First, we used the product density of
all producer firms to test Alt. H1a and Alt. H1b. We then test-
1
A currently popular way to incorporate
spatial concerns in models of agglomera-
tion uses the actual geographic distances
of organizations from each other, some-
times as weighted density variables (see
Sorenson and Audia, 2000; Sorenson and
Stuart, 2001). When theoretical ideas con-
cern the costs or frictions of spatial dis-
tance, these measures are superior to
simple counts of density within specified
geographic areas because they contain
more detailed information. The theoretical
ideas here, however, concern the interac-
tion patterns occurring in places with
related identities themselves; organiza-
tions either reside in such places or they
do not, meaning that the relevant theoret-
ical distinction is categorical in nature.
Hence, we used densities grouped by
geographic area in examining the possible
effects of agglomeration in such places.
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ed a refinement of these hypotheses using more narrowly
defined counts of product density that might be related to
product visibility and identity: the density of products for the
non-captive array market of original equipment manufacturers
or plug compatible manufacturers, resellers, and distributors.
We examined the effects of the percentage of array firms
that were members of the RAB on rates of array producer
entry and exit (percentage of firms in RAB). In exploratory
analyses, we used an alternative specification of the quarterly
or annual density of RAB firms in lieu of the percentage of
RAB members on rates of entry and exit; both specifications
yielded virtually identical estimates. We recorded the total
annual funding of disk array companies by venture capital
firms (venture capital array funding) based on the information
we obtained from the SDC Platinum database of Thomson
Financial Securities Data. For total industry revenue, we used
Disk/Trend’s figure of worldwide industry revenue from 1992
to 1998. For the period 1986 to 1992, prior to the publication
of Disk/Trend’s first report on the market, we estimated
industry revenue based on an exponential extrapolation from
1986 up to the exact 1992 industry figure. Our knowledge of
the industry gave us a reasonable level of confidence in
these early figures.
Stochastic Model and Estimation
Founding/entry estimation. Consistent with standard frame-
works for estimating rates of organizational entry/founding
(see Carroll and Hannan, 2000), we estimated array producer
entry using event-count models in which the array market
represented the unit at risk of experiencing an event. For this
reason, entry models estimated the effects of population-
level and environmental variables but not firm-level covari-
ates. The entry models were based on quarterly counts of
array producers entering the array market. Covariates were
updated every quarter, the only exceptions being annual mea-
sures of industry revenue and venture capital array funding,
for which quarterly data were not available.
To estimate array entry rates, we explored both Poisson and
negative binomial specifications. Exploratory analyses
revealed the presence of overdispersion, in which the vari-
ance of the event counts exceeds the mean (see Barron,
1992; Swaminathan, 1995), suggesting the appropriateness
of the negative binomial form, which includes a parameter for
overdispersion. For the negative binomial model, the relation-
ship between the instantaneous rate of entry, λt, and a set of
j covariates, Zjt, was specified as:
ln t =  + 
j
jZjt + εt,
where  is the regression model constant, j are effects of
covariates, and εt is the error term, which follows a gamma
distribution. We estimated negative binomial regressions
using the software package STATA.
Exit/disbanding estimation. We represented variation in
tenure (u) in the disk array market as a piecewise-exponential
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function with breakpoints for the pieces denoted as 0  τ1
τ2  .|.|.  τp. Assuming that τp+1 = ∞, gives P periods: Ip = 
u | τp  u  τp+1, p = 1,.|.|.,P. After examining life tables and
exploring estimates of a variety of choices of the breakpoints,
we decided to break the duration scale (in years) at 2.0 and
4.0. With this choice, the first segment (0, 2.0] included
dated events that occurred within the first 24 months in the
industry along with cases that entered and exited at
unknown times within the same year. The second segment
(2.0, 4.0] included dated events that occurred within the sec-
ond 24 months along with cases that entered at unknown
times in one year and exited at unknown times in the next
year. The final segment began at four years and was open on
the right.
We specified that the instantaneous disbanding/exit rate µi
for organization i was a function of the following form:
lni(u, t) = mp + Sit +Nit + k kXkit, u  0, u ∈ Ip
where tenure is denoted by u, mp denotes a set of tenure-
specific effects, Sit denotes organizational size for firm i at
time t, Nit denotes organizational density, and the k other
time-varying covariates are summarized in Xkit. In basic tests
of the hypotheses, we estimated models with this general
form with the method of maximum likelihood as implement-
ed with a user-defined routine in STATA (Sørensen, 1999).
Estimation of rate models with time-varying covariates
required the construction of split-spell data whereby
observed durations were artificially broken and censored at
periodic points when the values of the covariates were
updated. For exit models, we updated values every year
because the majority of the independent variables were
based on annual, not quarterly, observations. Tables 1 and 2
provide descriptive statistics for the variables used in both
the entry and exit analyses. A few variables have different
minimum and maximum values for entry and exit due to the
different units of time (quarterly versus annual spells, respec-
tively). Appendix tables A.1 and A.2 provide correlations
among the key independent variables for entry and exit
models.2
FINDINGS
Organizational Founding/Entry
Table 3 reports our first set of founding/entry rate models for
worldwide array producers. Model 1 represents a baseline
model with the main controls and array producer density.
Results in model 2 support H1a, as the density of de novo
array producers significantly increases entry into the disk
array market. Model 3 shows that the percentage of firms in
the RAB significantly reduces entry, contrary to predictions
based on institutional theory, and that the density of products
has nonsignificant effects on entry, contrary to Alt. H1a. Mod-
els 4 and 5 demonstrate the robustness of de novo density in
increasing firm entry, even controlling for the percentage of
firms in the RAB and the density of all products and those for
the OEM/PCM market.3
2
High correlation among covariates sug-
gests potential problems of estimation
due to multicollinearity (see Maddala,
1988; Kennedy, 1992; Greene, 2000).
Estimates with collinear data do not vio-
late the standard assumptions of regres-
sion and offer unbiased and efficient esti-
mates (Kennedy, 1992; Greene, 2000).
Econometrics textbooks suggest that
multicollinearity is usually not a problem
when statistically significant support is
found with collinear data (Maddala, 1988;
Kennedy, 1992). Since the effects of
many of our key explanatory variables
show statistical significance (at the level
of p < .05), we are fairly confident that
with our specifications, issues of multi-
collinearity do not affect the findings. But
because estimates with collinear data can
be sensitive to changes in the number of
observations in a sample (Maddala, 1988;
Kennedy, 1992; Greene, 2000), we re-ran
our entry models, which would be most
susceptible to multicollinearity, without
the last quarterly observation and found
little change in our original estimates. In
fact, when there was any change, it
amplified our hypothesized effects. These
estimates are available upon request.
3
De novo density also had substantive
effects on firm entry rates. When density
of de novo firms reached its mean value
of 12 organizations, the entry rates of
firms into the disk array market increased
by approximately 8 times, suggesting an
800 percent increase in entry rates due to
this variable. In contrast, the predicted
density of de alio firms was not signifi-
cant and had hardly any effect on firm
entry rates.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Disk Array Producer Entry/Founding Models*
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Industry revenue/1000 (t) 4.40 4.92 .003 12.6
Venture capital array funding/1000 (t) 15.5 19.0 0 59.3
Density of all firms (t-1) 79.8 65.0 0 180
Density of de novo firms (t-1) 12.3 9.06 0 27
Density of de alio firms (t-1) 67.5 56.2 0 158
Percentage of firms in RAB (t-1) .080 .092 0 .217
Density of products (t-1) 187.1 168.7 0 475
Density of products for OEM/PCM market (t-1) 144.2 133.7 0 392
Density of firms outside Boston area (t-1) 71.2 59.5 0 165
Density of Boston area firms (t-1) 8.59 5.79 0 16
Density of firms outside California (t-1) 51.8 43.4 0 117
Density of California firms (t-1) 28.0 21.8 0 63
Density of firms outside Bay Area (t-1) 66.7 56.0 0 153
Density of Bay Area firms (t-1) 13.1 9.21 0 27
Density of Boston area de novo firms (t-1) .549 .503 0 1
Density of Boston area de alio firms (t-1) 8.04 5.36 0 15
Density of California de novo firms (t-1) 5.43 3.53 0 11
Density of California de alio firms (t-1) 22.5 18.4 0 54
Density of Bay Area de novo firms (t-1) 3.51 1.91 0 6
Density of Bay Area de alio firms (t-1) 9.61 7.42 0 21
* N of firm entries/foundings = 258; N of de novo firm entries = 45; N of de alio firm entries = 213; N of spells = 51
quarters.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Disk Array Producer Disbanding/Exit Split-Spell File*
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max.
OEM or PCM firm = 1 .819 .385 0 1
De novo firm = 1 .153 .361 0 1
Size of firm (t) 49.6 274.2 .105 3517.2
Industry revenue/1000 (t) 7.32 4.25 .003 12.6
Density delay all firms (u0) 74.7 58.7 0 189
Density of all firms (t) 138.5 56.2 0 189
Density of de novo firms (t) 21.8 6.01 0 29
Density of de alio firms (t) 127.7 41.1 1 165
Number of products for firm (t) 3.72 4.29 0 36
Publicly traded firm = 1 (t) .267 .442 0 1
RAB member = 1 (t) .162 .368 0 1
Venture capital recipient = 1 .039 .195 0 1
Offers single-use product = 1 (t) .130 .336 0 1
Offers mainframe product = 1 (t) .057 .233 0 1
Offers network product = 1 (t) .879 .327 0 1
Offers high-performance product = 1 (t) .066 .248 0 1
Venture capital array funding/1000 (t) 15.0 16.2 0 59
Population age at entry (u0) 6.93 2.30 1 13
Percentage of firms in RAB (t) .162 .065 0 .217
Density of products (t) 584.9 218.9 1 763
Density of products for OEM/PCM market (t) 214.0 81.9 1 299
Density of firms outside Boston area (t) 135.6 43.1 1 173
Density of Boston area firms (t) 13.9 3.13 0 18
Density of firms outside California (t) 95.9 30.2 1 122
Density of California firms (t) 53.6 15.6 0 68
Density of firms outside Bay Area (t) 124.9 39.7 1 160
Density of Bay Area firms (t) 24.5 6.49 0 31
Density of Boston area de novo firms (t) 1.11 .392 0 2
Density of Boston area de alio firms (t) 12.8 2.86 0 16
Density of California de novo firms (t) 8.97 2.28 0 11
Density of California de alio firms (t) 44.6 13.9 0 58
Density of Bay Area de novo firms (t) 5.67 1.01 0 7
Density of Bay Area de alio firms (t) 18.8 5.91 0 26
* N of all firms = 258; N of de novo firms = 45; N of de alio firms = 213; N of firms’ exits = 114 (including acquisitions
128); N of de novo firms’ exits = 14(17); N of de alio firms’ exits = 100(111); N of firm-years = 1219; N of de novo firm-
years = 187; N of de alio firm-years = 1032.
Table 4 presents the general effects of geographic agglomer-
ation in the Boston area, California, and the San Francisco
Bay Area and the role of geographically agglomerated de
novo producers in these same areas on all entry rates, with-
out regard to location. Models 6 through 8 show strong sup-
port for H2a, as the density of each geographic agglomera-
tion, including Boston, California, and Bay Area firms,
significantly increases entry rates.4 Models 9 through 11 offer
some general support for H3a, that geographically agglomer-
ated de novo producers will increase firm entry rates. In
models 10 and 11, the density of California and Bay Area de
novo producers, respectively, significantly increases entry
rates. In model 9, however, the density of de alio firms in
Boston, and not de novo Boston firms, significantly increases
entry rates.5
Figures 2 and 3 plot the predicted significant effects of densi-
ties of geographically agglomerated producers (models 6
through 8) and geographically agglomerated de novo and de
alio producers (models 9 through 11) on firm entry rates. Fig-
ure 2 shows that firm density in the Boston area has the
strongest positive effect on all firm entry, followed by the
Bay Area density and then California density. For example,
when density in the Boston area reaches 10 firms, it increas-
es entry into the disk array market by about 8 times (an 800
percent increase). Figure 3 shows that although the density
of de alio firms in the Boston area significantly increases
entry rates, this effect is much weaker than the positive
effects on entry by either the Bay Area de novo firms or Cali-
fornia de novo firms. The density of Bay Area de novo firms
shows the most powerful positive effect on entry rates.
4
In these models, the density of firms out-
side the geographic agglomerations of
Boston, California, and the Bay Area
reduced entry rates (for non-California
firms, this is statistically significant). We
believe this is due to the substantial geo-
graphic dispersion of disk array producers
across the United States and the world,
such that 59 percent of all non-Boston
array producers were outside of Califor-
nia, and over 88 percent of all non-Califor-
nia and Bay Area firms were outside of
Boston. Disk array production occurred in
24 different states and 12 different for-
eign countries. We found similar results
when we ran models combining Boston
and California de novo density: the com-
bined de novo variable significantly
increased entry, while the density of firms
outside of Boston and California reduced
entry but was not significant.
5
The nonsignificant effects of Boston de
novo firms may be related to their small
density (a maximum of one Boston de
novo firm in our entry data). The positive
effects of Boston de alio density on array
producer entry rates may be related to
their role in geographic agglomeration:
the density of Boston area firms signifi-
cantly increased array producer entry
rates, and Boston de alio firms constitut-
ed an overwhelming proportion of Boston
area firms (on average, 14 times as many
de alio to de novo firms in Boston). The
substantive effect of Boston de alio den-
sity in increasing array producer entry
rates, however, was lower than with all
other (non-Boston) de novo density
counts.
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Table 3
ML Estimates of Negative Binomial Models of Founding/Entry Rates of Disk Array Producers, 1986 to 1998*
Model
Variable .(1) .(2) .(3) .(4) .(5)
Constant .365 .123 .342 .146 .092
(.246) (.245) (.246) (.245) (.247)
Industry revenue/1000 (t) –.218••• –.307••• –.057 –.183•• –.231•••
(.041) (.045) (.079) (.079) (.076)
Venture capital array funding/1000 (t) .017••• .008 .015••• .007 .007
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.006)
Density of all firms (t-1) .021••• .013
(.003) (.010)
Density of de novo firms (t-1) .198••• .185••• .187•••
(.051) (.052) (.055)
Density of de alio firms (t-1) –.0001 –.013 .002
(.007) (.012) (.013)
Percentage of firms in RAB (t-1) –10.5• –7.34 –5.16
(4.66) (4.21) (4.30)
Density of products (t-1) .004 .005
(.004) (.003)
Density of products for OEM/PCM market (t-1) .0007
(.004)
Dispersion parameter .272 .171 .219 .144 .158
Log likelihood –118.6 –113.3 –116.2 –111.1 –112.6
Chi square vs. null (constant rate) 38.7 49.1 43.5 53.6 50.6
D.f. 3 4 5 6 6
• p < .05; •• p <.025; ••• p <.01.
* Standard errors are in parentheses; N of observations = 51.
When Bay Area de novo density reaches six firms, the entry
rate increases 30 times (a 3000 percent increase).
Organizational Disbanding/Exit
Table 5 presents the results of our first set of array producer
disbanding/exit estimates. Model 12 offers a baseline of the
key firm-specific and industry-level factors affecting firm exit.
Model 13 shows that the density of array producers had a
significant positive effect on firm exit, which supports our
earlier speculation that existing theories of organizational
form emergence may not fully explain the evolution of organi-
zational forms in the array market. Models 14 through 17 all
offer strong support for the focused-identity hypothesis of
organizational form development for exit events (H1b), as the
density of de novo firms significantly reduces firm exit, con-
trolling for a host of additional firm-specific and industry-level
controls. In contrast, across these same models, the density
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Table 4
ML Estimates of Negative Binomial Models of Founding/Entry Rates of Disk Array Producers, 1986 to 1998*
Model
Variable .–(6) .–(7) .–(8) .–(9) .(10) .(11)
Constant .252 .182 .212 .211 –.115 –.228
(.240) (.247) (.240) (.247) (.280) (.318)
Industry revenue/1000 (t) –.015 –.188• –.052 .003 –.310••• –.070
(.073) (.084) (.070) (.075) (.093) (.066)
Venture capital array funding/1000 (t) .001 .007 .007 .001 –.001 .001
(.007) (.006) (.006) (.007) (.006) (.006)
Percentage of firms in RAB (t-1) –7.54 –4.87 –5.62 –8.16 –.079 –3.55
(4.31) (4.55) (4.42) (4.33) (4.64) (4.21)
Density of products (t-1) .007 .002 .005 .008• .005 .007•
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.003)
Density of Boston area firms (t-1) .221•••
(.083)
Density of firms outside Boston area (t-1) –.022 –.025
(.017) (.017)
Density of Boston area de novo firms (t-1) –.016
(.323)
Density of Boston area de alio firms (t-1) .245•••
(.088)
Density of California firms (t-1) .140•••
(.043)
Density of firms outside California (t-1) –.039 –.047••
(.020) (.018)
Density of California de novo firms (t-1) .446•••
(.132)
Density of California de alio firms (t-1) .081
(.046)
Density of Bay Area firms (t-1) .163•••
(.047)
Density of firms outside Bay Area (t-1) –.021 –.031•
(.014) (.014)
Density of Bay Area de novo firms (t-1) .550•••
(.170)
Density of Bay Area de alio firms (t-1) .099)
(.051)
Dispersion parameter .143 .156 .143 .138 .107 .108
Log likelihood –113.4 –111.8 –111.3 –113.1 –109.1 –108.6
Chi square vs. null (constant rate) 49.0 52.2 53.21 49.6 57.7 58.6
D.f. 6 6 6 7 7 7
• p <. 05; •• p <. 025; ••• p < .01.
* Standard errors are in parentheses; N of observations = 51.
of de alio firms significantly increases firm exit. In models 16
and 17, the density of products and products for the
OEM/PCM market have nonsignificant (positive) effects on
firm exit, which does not support Alt. H1b.
Table 6 examines the general effects on exit rates of geo-
graphic agglomeration in the Boston area, California, and the
Bay Area and the role of geographically agglomerated de
novo producers in these same geographic areas. Models 18
through 20 offer mixed support for H2b, which predicted that
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Figure 2. Effects of densities of geographically agglomerated firms on entry rate of all firms into the disk
array market.
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Figure 3. Effects of densities of geographically agglomerated de novo and de alio firms on entry rate of all
firms into the disk array market.
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the density of geographically agglomerated producers would
drive form development through reduced exit rates. Only the
density of firms in Boston significantly reduces exit rates,
while the density of California and Bay Area firms has non-
significant (negative) effects on exit rates.6 In contrast, in
models 21 through 23, respectively, the density of Boston,
6
The density of firms outside the geo-
graphic agglomerations of Boston, Califor-
nia, and the Bay Area increases exit rates
(significant in models 18 and 20). As with
our entry analyses, we believe this is
based on the geographic dispersion of
disk array producers, (continued, p. 85)
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Table 5
ML Estimates of Piecewise Constant Rate Models of Disbanding/Exit of Disk Array Producers*
Model
Variable .(12) .(13) .(14) .(15) .(16) .(17)
Tenure: 0 < u <= 2 –1.94••• –2.87••• –1.81••• –1.71 –.093 –.145
(.408) (.566) (.667) (.967) (1.00) (.945)
Tenure: 2 < u <= 4 –1.64••• –2.49••• –1.34 –.947 .529 .467
(.467) (.603) (.692) (.963) (1.02) (.951)
Tenure: u > 4 –1.57••• –2.18••• –.682 .002 1.19 1.14
(.547) (.636) (.772) (1.01) (1.06) (.996)
OEM or PCM firm = 1 –.681• –.840••• –.759•• –.904••• –.944••• –.945•••
(.304) (.315) (.308) (.345) (.345) (.344)
De novo firm = 1 –.245 –.137 –.053 –.137 –.087 –.090
(.280) (.281) (.280) (.299) (.298) (.298)
Size of firm (t) –.239•• –.253•• –.175• –.123 –.120 –.123
(.098) (.106) (.080) (.070) (.068) (.070)
Industry revenue/1000 (t) .044 –.083 .131•• .109 .034 .185••
(.043) (.059) (.057) (.063) (.106) (.075)
Density delay all firms (u0) .005 .006•• .009••• .004 .004 .003
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Density all firms (t) .012•••
(.004)
Density of de novo firms (t) –.198••• –.232••• –.538••• –.535•••
(.048) (.056) (.111) (.121)
Density of de alio firms (t) .022••• .024••• .010 .025•••
(.004) (.005) (.020) (.008)
Number of products for firm (t) –.177••• –.172••• –.173•••
(.066) (.066) (.066)
Public firm = 1 (t) –.294 –.265 –.264
(.304) (.307) (.307)
RAB member = 1 (t) –1.86 –1.90 –1.89
(1.02) (1.02) (1.02)
Venture capital recipient = 1 –.565 –.693 –.722
(1.05) (1.06) (1.06)
Single-use product = 1 (t) .059 .013 .011
(.370) (.369) (.370)
Mainframe product = 1 (t) –15.6 –16.0 –15.8
(1232.3) (1480.6) (1298.9)
Network product = 1 (t) –.145 –.185 –.177
(.421) (.424) (.426)
High-performance product = 1 (t) –1.26 –1.30 –1.28 
(.860) (.859) (.861)
Venture capital array funding/1000 (t) –.001 .006 –.009
(.010) (.013) (.017)
Population age at entry (u0) .210 .148 .172
(.140) (.140) (.144)
Percentage of firms in RAB (t) 30.8••• 16.3
(8.06) (10.3)
Density of products (t) .005
(.005)
Density of products for the OEM/PCM .010
—market (t) (.006)
Log likelihood –249.6 –244.0 –233.3 –211.4 –202.0 –201.0
Chi square vs. null (constant rate) 72.6 83.8 105.2 149.1 168.0 169.9
D.f. 7 8 9 19 21 21
• p < .05; •• p < .025; ••• p < .01.
* Standard errors are in parentheses. N of observations = 1539; N of firms = 258; N of exit events (does not include
acquisitions) = 114.
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Table 6
ML Estimates of Piecewise Constant Rate Models of Disbanding/Exit of Disk Array Producers*
Model
Variable .(18) .(19) .(20) .(21) .(22) .(23)
Tenure: 0 < u <= 2 –.660 –3.90•• –3.49• –.705 .755 .230
(.988) (1.65) (1.58) (.985) (1.00) (.964)
Tenure: 2 < u <= 4 –.047 –3.39• –3.00 –.104 1.39 .852
(1.01) (1.64) (1.58) (1.01) (1.04) (.993)
Tenure: u > 4 .557 –2.96 –2.54 .514 2.08 1.55
(1.06) (1.63) (1.58) (1.06) (1.10) (1.05)
OEM or PCM firm = 1 –.937••• –.992••• –.993••• –.940••• –.973••• –.958•••
(.345) (.344) (.343) (.345) (.346) (.345)
De novo firm = 1 –.101 –.147 –.153 –.105 –.111 –.099
(.298) (.299) (.299) (.298) (.299) (.298)
Size of firm (t) –.134 –.186 –.194 –.137 –.126 –.126
(.078) (.105) (.109) (.080) (.072) (.073)
Industry revenue/1000 (t) –.032 .089 .032 –.046 –.126 –.312••
(.100) (.120) (.117) (.101) (.130) (.138)
Density delay all firms (u0) .004 .005 .005 .004 .003 .003
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Number of products for firm  (t) –.177••• –.188••• –.188••• –.177••• –.174••• –.173•••
(.066) (.067) (.067) (.066) (.066) (.066)
Public firm = 1 (t) –.265 –.280 –.279 –.267 –.288 –.276
(.306) (.303) (.303) (.306) (.308) (.308)
RAB member = 1 (t) –1.88 –1.82 –1.81 –1.87 –1.88 –1.88
(1.02) (1.02) (1.02) (1.02) (1.02) (1.02)
Venture capital recipient = 1 –.662 –.277 –.284 –.662 –.548 –.738
(1.07) (1.05) (1.05) (1.07) (1.05) (1.07)
Single-use product = 1 (t) .042 .090 .090 .044 .059 .042
(.370) (.373) (.375) (.371) (.373) (.373)
Mainframe product = 1 (t) –15.0 –14.4 –14.4 –15.0 –15.7 –15.0
(910.9) (725.3) (722.3) (909.6) (1312.1) (898.8)
Network product = 1 (t) –.165 –.165 –.164 –.159 –.132 –.131
(.423) (.424) (.426) (.425) (.428) (.429)
High-performance product = 1 (t) –1.27 –1.28 –1.26 –1.26 –1.21 –1.22
(.859) (.868) (.870) (.860) (.859) (.859)
Venture capital array funding/1000 (t) –.016 .005 .007 –.016 .119••• .058••
(.012) (.018) (.014) (.011) (.034) (.026)
Population age at entry (u0) .104 –.004 .012 .116 .172 .179
(.135) (.121) (.123) (.138) (.144) (.145)
Percentage of firms in RAB (t) 34.5••• 1.53 6.04 37.4••• 10.9 12.9
(9.64) (4.91) (6.29) (11.0) (5.74) (8.06)
Density of products (t) –.037••• –.006 –.008 –.038••• .023••• –.015
(.009) (.005) (.004) (.010) (.007) (.008)
Density of Boston area firms (t) –1.00•••
(.236)
Density of firms outside Boston area (t) .211••• .215•••
(.049) (.051)
Density of Boston area de novo firms (t) –1.39•
(.688)
Density of Boston area de alio firms (t) –.978•••
(.245)
Density of California firms (t) –.004
(.109)
Density of firms outside California (t) .058 .449•••
(.048) (.113)
Density of California de novo firms (t) –2.45•••
(.232)
Density of California de alio firms (t) –.910•••
(.232)
Density of Bay Area firms (t) –.074
(.095)
Density of firms outside Bay Area (t) .061•• .211•••
(.026) (.072)
Density of Bay Area de novo firms (t) –2.01•••
(.502)
Density of Bay Area de alio firms (t) –.528•••
(.181)
Log likelihood –209.4 –219.8 –219.2 –209.2 –202.0 –201.5
Chi square vs. null (constant rate) 153.2 132.3 133.6 153.5 167.9 168.8
D.f. 21 21 21 22 22 23
• p < .05; •• p < .025; ••• p < .01.
* Standard errors are in parentheses. N of observations = 1539; N of firms = 258; N of exit events (does not include
acquisitions) = 114.
DISCUSSION
Disk array production may never become an organizational
form, as defined by an external identity code. In fact, the
trend in the last year or so has been for market analysts, the
trade press, and the companies themselves to treat disk
arrays as one element in a storage network, along with soft-
ware, tape drives, switches, and routers. Although disk
arrays underpin these networks, “data storage” may become
the external identity that spawns an organizational form. If
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California, and Bay Area de novo firms each significantly
reduces firm exit rates, offering strong support for the role of
geographically agglomerated de novo producers in reducing
exit rates (H3b).
In models 21 through 23, densities of de alio firms in these
locales also reduce firm exit. Boston de alio firms may
reduce exit rates because of their disproportionate role in
geographic agglomeration, as Boston area density significant-
ly reduces exit rates (model 18). The case of California and
Bay Area de alio firms may simply implicate more complex
competitive dynamics than our present theorizing and model-
ing have captured, although the magnitude of agglomerated
de alio density effects is substantially smaller than that of
agglomerated de novo firms. Based on unreported multiplier
rate calculations, Boston area de novo firms reduce exit rates
1.4 times more than Boston area de alio firms, California de
novo firms reduce exit rates 2.7 times more than California
de alio firms, and Bay Area de novo firms reduce exit rates
3.8 times more than Bay Area de alio firms. Figure 4 demon-
strates this using firms agglomerated in the Bay Area as an
example (based on model 23). It takes three de novo firms
operating in the Bay Area to reduce exit rates practically to
zero, whereas about 10 de alio firms operating in the Bay
Area are required to have the same effect on exit rates.
which impairs organizational form devel-
opment. We also found similar results
when we ran models combining Boston
and California de novo density: the com-
bined de novo variable significantly
reduced exit rates, while the density of
firms outside of Boston and California
increased exit but was not significant.
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Figure 4. Effects of densities of Bay Area de novo and Bay Area de alio firms on exit rate of all firms into the
disk array market.
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so, it would invoke a different set of identity rules for firm
behavior and appearance; it would also include a much more
diverse set of technologies and associated business firms.
Notwithstanding this possibility, we think the findings here
demonstrate a potentially useful approach for analyzing how
and where identity-based organizational forms emerge. We
have made two claims about perceptually focused identities
that empirical analysis supports: (1) the legitimation of an
organizational form emanates from the number of de novo
firms in a market, and (2) a large number of de novo firms
within a geographic agglomeration possessing a related iden-
tity will accelerate identity formation. This amounted to
respecifying the density-dependent process currently thought
to lead to an organizational form.
The findings for the density of de novo firms in disk array
production supported the claim about perceptual focus, since
in this market de alio firms came from diverse origins and
often retained significant activities in those areas, while de
novo firms tended to focus on disk arrays. All other things
being equal, an identity is more likely to be perceived and
thus to gel into a recognizable form faster—and at lower lev-
els of density—when the constituent organizations possess
similar unit identities themselves than when they are hetero-
geneous. Such a development might be spurred by both
intra- and extra-industry processes. Among a set of organiza-
tions, a common structure means that firms are likely to rely
on common resources of labor, customers, and the like. They
are also more likely to identify with each other, recognize
common interests, and develop solidarity. Externally, the
common features among de novo firms means that outsiders
can more readily see the unit character in the grouping of
firms and act accordingly.
The findings for agglomeration speak to social science’s
broad acceptance of the idea that organizational activity tends
to be spatially concentrated. Economists, regional scientists,
industrial sociologists and economic geographers generally
agree that economic benefits accrue to firms that cluster
(Becattini, 1990; Porter, 1990; Krugman, 1991; Storper, 1995;
Hayter, 1997; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001) and that these ben-
efits—agglomeration effects—increase with the number of
firms in the cluster (Arthur, 1986). Agglomerations may
enhance innovation, improve operational efficiency and stim-
ulate economic growth through information spillovers, labor
market pooling, the availability of specialized suppliers tai-
lored to the industry, and a spirit of rivalry among competing
firms that, in turn, enhances learning (Saxenian, 1991, 1994;
Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993; Feldman, 1994;
Head, Ries, and Swenson, 1995; McKendrick, Doner, and
Haggard, 2000).
In a narrow sense, our findings agree with these positive
evaluations of agglomeration. But they also suggest, as oth-
ers have argued (Carroll and Wade, 1991; Swaminathan and
Wiedenmayer, 1991; Lomi, 1995), that agglomeration might
be a more general factor shaping the evolution of organiza-
tional populations, in this case, the emergence of an organi-
zational form. Ecologists have long hinted that the level of
spatial aggregation implicitly defines population boundaries
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and that organizations’ resource requirements generally have
a geographic basis (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Our findings
show that the level of analysis is indeed an important factor
in determining how an institutionalized organizational form
emerges. Despite possible appearances to the contrary, our
findings are also largely consistent with the prior theories
about legitimation and geography: whereas Hannan et al.’s
(1995) story about legitimation operating on a broader geo-
graphic scale applied to the spread of established organiza-
tional forms to new populations, the story developed here
concerns the initial emergence of a form in any population.
Moreover, in developing the theoretical arguments, we have
further modified the specification of the density-dependent
process to incorporate particular locations explicitly. If a
potential disk array form does get perceived and coheres, it
may result not only from the number of de novo producers in
a market but also from the number of de novo producers that
are also geographically clustered in a place with a related
identity. The core idea is that the propinquity of de novo firms
in a place with a related social identity may engender aware-
ness of the potential form and make it more visible and
salient to external evaluators. Additionally, the perception that
organizations derive public cognitive recognition from cluster-
ing can even override to some extent the diffuse identity of
de alio firms to create a sense of homogeneity and generate
solidarity. Although, consistent with our theory, de novo firms
had a considerably stronger effect than de alio firms on low-
ering exit rates, our findings suggested that form emergence
may be even more strongly related to geographic clustering
than we theorized initially. Indeed, a market composed of
geographically dispersed organizations may make it difficult
for diverse actors to recognize and act on their commonali-
ties; it may also make it harder for outsiders to see and iden-
tify the form, especially if they are engaged only in captive
production. Moreover, the initial steps of identity generation
may be highly localized, but the process spreads quite rapidly
across geographic boundaries. In disk arrays, an increase in
the number of agglomerated firms in the Bay Area and
Boston region reduced the exit rates for all firms in the mar-
ket; disk array firms in Taiwan and Europe benefited from the
legitimation process in the U.S.
In terms of future research, the findings suggest several
avenues. One emerges from a limitation of our study noted
by one of the reviewers, namely, that we do not examine the
actions of external agents. Although we used what financial
analysts and market participants wrote and said about the
market to develop our theory, we did not systematically
study them. Obviously, attending more carefully to how out-
siders classify organizations can bear fruit (Zuckerman 1999,
2000; Zuckerman and Kim, 2003), as the salient bases of
identity are likely to be quite different for different external
audiences (Philips and Zuckerman, 2001). If codes are
enforced differently from place to place, researchers might
need to tailor their typologies of organizational form to the
specific locale and social context under study. Baron (2002)
speculated that different kinds of informants are likely to clas-
sify organizations along dimensions that do not correspond to
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product markets. More systematic analysis of relevant out-
siders could contribute to a better understanding of form
emergence. Human resource officers or recruiters or even
potential employees, for example, give greater importance
than other evaluators to an organization’s labor market identi-
ty (Baron, 2002). Hsu and Podolny (2002) used content analy-
sis of movie reviews to determine how films and genres can
be classified, an approach that could be used to classify firms
and their identities. There is certainly room for more research
on how external agents perceive organizational identities.
A second area could focus on the ecological consequences
of delineating identities based on labor market versus prod-
uct market considerations (Baron, 2002). In fact, Baron and
Hannan (2001) found evidence that organizations that estab-
lished a labor market identity prior to a product market identi-
ty were less likely to alter their labor market model over time
than were organizations that were product-driven.
A final point regarding the role played by geography in the
development of organizational forms seems important to con-
sider in future research. Those who study organizations and
geography appear to characterize agglomeration, at least
implicitly, in two ways. One approach treats agglomerations
in largely functional terms, as places where close proximity in
input-output relations confers economic benefits, such as
economies of scale, innovation, and economizing on transac-
tion costs. A second more sociological view characterizes
agglomerations as places with social identities of their own,
independent of any single market cluster. Are the transaction-
al qualities of agglomerations or the social identities of place
more relevant to form emergence? We cannot answer for
certain, as we found evidence that suggests both processes
operate in the disk array market. In support of the view that
an agglomeration’s functional attributes may contribute to
form emergence, for example, was the difference in the
magnitude of positive effects on entry rates that appear to
reflect the physical proximity of geographical clustering: the
Boston area, with the largest effect, is more compact than
the Bay Area, and the Bay Area is a subset of California. But
we also found it intriguing that our findings were associated
with two locations with strong identities of place, Route 128
and Silicon Valley. Both places have related identities recog-
nized by market participants and external agents. Compared
with other locations, they likely have denser direct and indi-
rect interaction patterns with their resident organizations,
thereby providing more focus to outsiders’ perceptions. But
we leave this as speculation and encourage researchers to
address each possibility.
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APPENDIX: Correlations of Variables
Table A.1
Correlations of Variables Used in Founding/Entry Analyses
Variable .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08 .09
01. Industry revenue/1000 (t)
02. Venture capital array funding/1000 (t) –.11
03. Density all firms (t-1) .86 –.08
04. Density de novo firms (t-1) .91 .01 .97
05. Density de alio firms (t-1) .85 –.10 .99 .96
06. Percentage of firms in RAB (t-1) .96 –.16 .91 .92 .90
07. Density of products (t-1) .81 –.11 .98 .92 .98 .88
08. Density of products by OEM/PCM producers (t-1) .83 –.14 .98 .92 .98 .89 .99
09. Density of firms outside Boston area (t-1) .87 –.10 .99 .97 .99 .91 .98 .98
10. Density of Boston area firms (t-1) .75 .15 .95 .92 .95 .78 .92 .91 .94
11. Density of firms outside California (t-1) .86 –.11 .99 .96 .99 .90 .98 .98 .99
12. Density of California firms (t-1) .88 –.03 .99 .98 .99 .91 .97 .97 .99
13. Density of firms outside Bay Area (t-1) .87 –.10 .99 .97 .99 .91 .98 .98 .99
14. Density of Bay Area firms (t-1) .80 .05 .98 .96 .97 .83 .95 .94 .97
15. Density of Boston area de novo firms (t-1) .66 .19 .81 .80 .80 .67 .81 .80 .80
16. Density of Boston area de alio firms (t-1) .74 .14 .95 .92 .95 .77 .92 .91 .94
17. Density of California de novo firms (t-1) .89 .12 .94 .97 .93 .86 .88 .88 .94
18. Density of California de alio firms (t-1) .87 –.06 .99 .97 .99 .91 .98 .98 .99
19. Density of Bay Area de novo firms (t-1) .74 .21 .91 .92 .90 .75 .86 .85 .90
20. Density of Bay Area de alio firms (t-1) .80 .00 .98 .95 .98 .84 .96 .94 .97
Variable .10 .11 .12 .13 .14 .15 .16 .17 .18
11. Density of firms outside California (t-1) .95
12. Density of California firms (t-1) .95 .99
13. Density of firms outside Bay Area (t-1) .94 .99 .99
14. Density of Bay Area firms (t-1) .97 .97 .98 .97
15. Density of Boston area de novo firms (t-1) .86 .80 .81 .80 .82
16. Density of Boston area de alio firms (t-1) .99 .95 .95 .94 .97 .84
17. Density of California de novo firms (t-1) .94 .93 .96 .94 .94 .80 .94
18. Density of California de alio firms (t-1) .94 .99 .99 .99 .98 .80 .94 .94
19. Density of Bay Area de novo firms (t-1) .96 .89 .93 .90 .95 .79 .96 .95 .91
20. Density of Bay Area de alio firms (t-1) .96 .97 .98 .97 .99 .81 .96 .93 .98
Variable .19
20. Density of Bay Area de alio firms (t-1) .92
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Table A.2
Correlations of Variables Used in Exit Analyses
Variable .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
01. OEM or PCM firm = 1
02. De novo firm = 1 .08
03. Size of firm (t) –.23 –.06
04. Industry revenue/1000 (t) .13 .01 .10
05. Density delay all firms (u0) .29 –.00 –.15 .44
06. Density of all firms (t) .16 –.03 .07 .86 .45
07. Density de novo firms (t) .16 –.02 .08 .84 .45 .87
08. Density de alio firms (t) .17 –.07 .02 .46 .34 .81 .73
09. Number of products for firm (t) –.16 –.07 .61 .19 –.18 .19 .20 .14
10. Publicly traded firm = 1 (t) –.43 –.14 .13 .02 –.18 .01 .03 .01 .12
11. RAB member = 1 (t) –.04 –.03 .27 .14 –.08 .15 .17 .14 .54
12. Venture capital recipient = 1 –.05 .48 –.02 –.01 –.07 –.04 –.04 –.07 –.04
13. Offers single-use product = 1 (t) .11 .10 –.07 .04 .12 .03 .02 .01 .05
14. Offers mainframe product = 1 (t) –.21 –.11 .33 .04 –.10 .01 .02 –.03 .23
15. Offers network product = 1 (t) .16 –.02 .06 .06 .06 .09 .11 .12 .14
16. Offers high-performance product = 1 (t) –.28 –.00 .04 –.10 –.23 –.11 –.12 –.11 .09
17. Venture capital array funding/1000 (t) –.11 .04 –.01 –.33 –.20 –.56 –.38 –.61 –.08
18. Population age at entry (u0) .23 .03 –.14 .45 .89 .46 .52 .39 –.17
19. Percentage of firms in RAB (t) .17 –.03 .07 .80 .44 .87 .94 .80 .19
20. Density of products (t) .18 –.04 .06 .76 .44 .96 .90 .91 .19
21. Density of products for OEM/PCM market (t) .17 –.05 .04 .57 .38 .78 .82 .85 .16
22. Density of firms outside Boston area (t) .17 –.07 .03 .55 .38 .86 .80 .99 .15
23. Density of Boston area firms (t) .13 –.08 –.01 .09 .19 .47 .51 .85 .07
24. Density of firms outside California (t) .17 –.07 .03 .53 .37 .86 .78 .99 .15
25. Density of California firms (t) .17 –.07 .03 .51 .37 .83 .79 .99 .15
26. Density of firms outside Bay Area (t) .17 –.07 .03 .56 .38 .87 .80 .99 .15
27. Density of Bay Area firms (t) .15 –.08 .01 .27 .28 .62 .66 .94 .11
28. Density of Boston area de novo firms (t) .05 –.04 –.02 –.19 .01 –.04 .19 .35 .01
29. Density of Boston area de alio firms (t) .13 –.08 –.01 .13 .21 .52 .53 .88 .08
30. Density of California de novo firms (t) .15 –.02 .08 .87 .45 .93 .94 .70 .19
31. Density of California de alio firms (t) .17 –.07 .02 .42 .34 .77 .73 .99 .14
32. Density of Bay Area de novo firms (t) .10 –.04 .02 .31 .25 .59 .62 .66 .11
33. Density of Bay Area de alio firms (t) .15 –.08 .00 .25 .26 .58 .62 .92 .11
Variable .10 .11 .12 .13 .14 .15 .16 .17 .18
11. RAB member = 1 (t) .18
12. Venture capital recipient = 1 .03 .06
13. Offers single-use product = 1 (t) –.16 –.09 –.03
14. Offers mainframe product = 1 (t) .15 .22 –.05 –.10
15. Offers network product = 1 (t) .03 .14 .06 –.37 –.17
16. Offers high-performance product = 1 (t) .13 .00 –.05 –.10 .05 –.44
17. Venture capital array funding/1000 (t) .03 –.10 .04 –.04 .03 –.05 .06
18. Population age at entry (u0) –.12 –.06 –.06 .10 –.06 .07 –.25 –.15
19. Percentage of firms in RAB (t) .01 .18 –.05 .02 .01 .11 –.12 –.57 .49
20. Density of products (t) .01 .16 –.05 .03 –.00 .11 –.12 –.58 .47
21. Density of products for OEM/PCM market (t) .00 .16 –.05 .01 –.01 .11 –.11 –.44 .42
22. Density of firms outside Boston area (t) .01 .15 –.07 .01 –.02 .12 –.11 –.60 .42
23. Density of Boston area firms (t) .03 .10 –.08 –.03 –.03 .12 –.09 –.45 .28
24. Density of firms outside California (t) .01 .15 –.07 .01 –.02 .12 –.11 –.62 .41
25. Density of California firms (t) .01 .15 –.07 .01 –.02 .12 –.11 –.55 .42
26. Density of firms outside Bay Area (t) .01 .15 –.07 .01 –.02 .12 –.11 –.61 .42
27. Density of Bay Area firms (t) .02 .13 –.08 –.01 –.03 .13 –.10 –.48 .36
28. Density of Boston area de novo firms (t) .03 .05 –.04 –.05 –.02 .07 –.04 –.22 .11
29. Density of Boston area de alio firms (t) .03 .11 –.08 –.03 –.03 .12 –.09 –.47 .29
30. Density of California de novo firms (t) .03 .15 –.04 .02 .02 .09 –.11 –.31 .50
31. Density of California de alio firms (t) .01 .14 –.07 .00 –.03 .12 –.11 –.57 .39
32. Density of Bay Area de novo firms (t) .04 .08 –.05 –.01 –.01 .08 –.08 –.04 .34
33. Density of Bay Area de alio firms (t) .01 .13 –.07 –.01 –.03 .13 –.10 –.52 .34
Variable .19 .20 .21 .22 .23 .24 .25 .26 .27
20. Density of products (t) .91
21. Density of products for OEM/PCM market (t) .90 .87
22. Density of firms outside Boston area (t) .85 .95 .95
23. Density of Boston area firms (t) .59 .61 .60 .81
24. Density of firms outside California (t) .84 .94 .94 .99 .83 (continued on page 93)
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Table A.2 (Continued)
Variable .19 .20 .21 .22 .23 .24 .25 .26 .27
25. Density of California firms (t) .83 .93 .93 .99 .83 .99
26. Density of firms outside Bay Area (t) .85 .95 .95 .99 .80 .99 .99
27. Density of Bay Area firms (t) .73 .78 .77 .92 .94 .93 .95 .91
28. Density of Boston area de novo firms (t) .29 .13 .10 .31 .72 .34 .36 .30 .60
29. Density of Boston area de alio firms (t) .61 .65 .64 .84 .99 .86 .86 .84 .95
30. Density of California de novo firms (t) .84 .89 .88 .77 .42 .76 .75 .78 .56
31. Density of California de alio firms (t) .79 .90 .90 .99 .86 .99 .99 .98 .97
32. Density of Bay Area de novo firms (t) .43 .63 .63 .67 .58 .66 .69 .67 .63
33. Density of Bay Area de alio firms (t) .73 .75 .74 .90 .94 .90 .92 .89 .99
Variable .28 .29 .30 .31 .32
29. Density of Boston area de alio firms (t) .65
30. Density of California de novo firms (t) –.06 .47
31. Density of California de alio firms (t) .41 .88 .68
32. Density of Bay Area de novo firms (t) .07 .63 .72 .65
33. Density of Bay Area de alio firms (t) .65 .94 .49 .95 .52

